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THE CONTINUING NEED FOR JUDICIAL
REFORM IN ILLINOIS
WAYLAND B. CEDARQUIST

need for judicial reform in Illinois was briefly stated in
1952.1 The need has since then become urgent. The measure
of the need is the gap between our aim of prompt justice for
all and our performance. Today's performance is marked by delay,
inefficiency and widespread lack of confidence in the courts. The gap
between aim and performance has become so great that, in order to
restore justice and preserve liberty, the people must recur to fundamental principles and take action to revise the judicial system of Illinois in accordance with those fundamental principles.
The purpose of this article is to re-state the need and to describe
the solution presently proposed. In order to place the matter in perspective, there will first be a description of the Illinois courts as now
organized, followed by a statement of the ways in which these courts
are inadequate for today's needs, and, finally, a discussion of the proposed Amendment to the Judicial Article to the Illinois Constitution,
which grew from these needs and which, on March 8, 1955, was in2
troduced in the Illinois General Assembly.
HE

I

THE ILLINOIS COURTS OF 1955

The Illinois courts of 1955 are organized substantially along lines
set forth in the Illinois Constitution of 1848. That constitution provided for most of the constitutional courts as we now know them-a
supreme court, circuit courts, county courts, and justices of the
1
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'The currently proposed Amendment to the Judicial Article was introduced in the
Illinois General Assembly on March 8, 1955, as H.J.R. 16 in the House and S.J.R. 17
in the Senate.
MR. CEDARQUIST received his A.B. at the University of Illinois and his LL.B. at Harvard University Law School. He is associated in the general practice of law with the
firm of Nelson, Boodell and Will, Chicago, Illinois. He has been a member of every
committee engaged in the current effort to prepare an Amendment to the Judicial
Article of the Illinois Constitution, from January, 1951, to the present date. He is a
member of the Joint Committee on the Judicial Article, appointed by the Illinois
State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association. The views expressed in
this article are his and not necessarily those of the Joint Committee or of either
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peace; and it authorized the legislature to create local courts in cities.
The Constitution of 1870 made possible the creation of appellate
courts and probate courts, and provided additional courts for Cook
County. Aside from the Chicago Charter Amendment of 1904, which
abolished justices of the peace, police magistrates and constables in
Chicago and made possible the creation of the Municipal Court of
Chicago, there have been no constitutional changes in the Judicial
Article from 1870 to the present day.

The supreme court, the court of ultimate appeal in the state, has
seven judges elected from seven judicial districts. The judicial districts are seven geographic areas, the boundaries of which have not
been changed in any important respect since 1870. In 1870, the
Seventh District, which includes Chicago and its surrounding industrial and metropolitan complex, had a population of about 500,000
people as eompared with the present population for that area of almost 5,000,000 people.
The supreme court not only has jurisdiction to take an appeal in
any case, but is required to take appeals in certain specified instances,
with power in the legislature to specify additional classes of cases.
The legislature, subject to political pressure from many sources, has
specified about forty classes of such cases. A survey in 1947 indicated
that these compulsory appeals made up 84% to 90% of the business
of the supreme court.3 In other words, the supreme court has no
choice as to the great majority of cases to be reviewed. The system of
compulsory appeals makes it almost impossible for the supreme court
to separate the wheat from the straw. The burden of compulsory
appeals, moreover, leaves the court little time to review other cases
involving important questions of law and matters of great importance
4
to the state, the business community and the people.
The supreme court has indicated that it believes it has rule-making
and administrative authority over the judicial system of the state.5
But the burden of appeals under the present system is such that the
court has found it difficult to exercise this authority. Indeed, aside
8Witwer, Jr., The Illinois Constitution and the Courts, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 53
(1947); Speck and Law Review Staff, A Study of the Illinois Supreme Court, op. cit.
107.
' "Tle outstanding characteristic ... is that the Supreme Court of Illinois is today
operating in a jurisdictional strait-jacket." Edmunds, Jurisdiction of the Courts [1952]
Ill. L. Forum 480, 518.
8
Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 I1. 145, 105 N.E. 2d 713 (1952).
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from promulgating rules of practice to supplement the Civil Practice
Act as enacted by the legislature, and aside from assigning circuit
court judges to serve in the appellate courts, the supreme court exercises no authority whatsoever over the running of the judicial system.
There are four appellate courts in Illinois, one in each of four districts. The appellate courts are staffed, not by judges elected specifically to that position, but by circuit judges assigned by the supreme
court to the appellate court. The appellate court, as the court of intermediate appeal, has jurisdiction to take appeals in all cases other than
those in which the right of direct appeal to the supreme court is
given.
The trial courts of the state make up the balance of the judicial
system. There are a large number of these courts and they present a
confusing and conflicting picture. In counties outside of Cook
County there are 101 county courts, 17 circuits with 54 judges holding court at set terms in each county, 13 probate courts, 26 city
courts and about 400 police magistrates and 2700 justices of the
peace. In Cook County there is a county court, a circuit court with
20 judges, a superior court with 36 judges, a criminal court (whose
judges are assigned from the circuit and superior courts), a juvenile
court (staffed by a judge of the circuit court), a probate court, the'
Municipal Court of Chicago with a chief justice and 36 judges, the
city courts for Chicago Heights and Calumet City, the Municipal
Courts of Evanston and Oak Park, and in that part of Cook County
outside Chicago, about 125 justices of the peace and 90 police magistrates. Most of these judges devote full time to their judicial duties.
County judges, however, have many quasi-administrative duties as
well as judicial duties. Moreover, a recent study shows that only one
in eight justices of the peace and one in five police magistrates spend
any appreciable amount of time performing judicial duties.' To sum
it up, the trial courts of the state are manned by 192 full-time judges
and 102 part-time judges; and there are about 100 justices of the
peace and 450 police magistrates performing some judicial service.
These courts are all trial courts in the sense that they hear evidence
and decide cases for the first time. However, each class of court has
a separate jurisdiction, with power to hear some cases but not others.
The matter is complicated by the fact that the jurisdiction of many
courts overlaps that of others. There are so many trial courts that the
'Local Judicial Activity, Local Government Notes, University of Illinois, No. 35
(Sept., 1952).
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question of what court should be chosen for the filing of a suit takes
up time and energy all out of proportion to its real importance. The
problems of one family in Chicago, for instance, may give rise to law
suits in as many as five different courts. Adoption is handled by the
county court, guardianship by the probate court, divorce in the circuit court, non-support in the Municipal Court of Chicago, and juvenile offenders may find themselves in the criminal court, the Boys
Court Branch of the Municipal Court, or the Juvenile Court. Or, a
personal injury suit can be filed in a municipal or city court, circuit
or superior court, and possibly the county court, depending on where
the accident happened and how much had to be claimed in the way
of damages. The worst feature of this jurisdictional maze is that, if a
case is filed in the wrong court, it must be dismissed and filed in the
right court, a process in which time and money are lost and in which
justice may be denied.
Superimposed on this complex system of trial courts is the fact that
some of the trial courts are regarded as superior and others as inferior,
so that when an inferior tribunal has decided the matter, the decision
can be "appealed" to another trial court, which re-tries the entire
case. This is trial de novo and involves hearing the evidence all over
again. There can be such a second trial in cases decided by justices
of the peace and police magistrates, as well as in some matters decided
by county and probate courts.
Moreover, every one of these trial courts is, so far as the business
of running the court is concerned, separate and independent. The
various classes of courts and indeed the individual judges are practically isolated. If the judges in one area are overloaded with work and
the judges in another area haven't enough work, there is no authority
anywhere to assign judges to assist in disposing of the backlog. All
that can be done is for the less busy judges to volunteer to serve temporarily in the busy areas.
Each courtroom is literally a kingdom unto itself. There is no real
authority in any one court to supervise the administrative affairs of
any other court. There is no administrative office of any kind in the
entire judicial system in Illinois. The creation of the Municipal Court
of Chicago in 1904 was a step forward, in that it was practically the
first court in any large metropolitan center in the United States to
have a chief judge with authority to run the administrative affairs of
the court. Aside from this one court, however, there is no other
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court in Illinois with a similar administrative system. The circuit and
superior courts of Cook County each have their own executive committee and chief judge, but these have no constitutional or statutory
power and have only such authority as is vested in them by the judges
themselves.
These trial courts are the courts closest to the people. It is here, as
Judge Vanderbilt has said, that'the people feel the keen, cutting edge
of the law. It is here that the suit for damages for a broken leg, the
suit for an injunction against breach of a business contract, the divorce
case, the adoption case, or the simple traffic violation are heard for the
first time. The volume of such judicial business in a state of 9,000,000
people is enormous. There are few accurate statistics, due to the lack
of any over-all administrative office for the courts. The clerks of the
circuit and superior courts of Cook County report, however, that in
the one month of February, 1955, there were 1533 new cases filed in
the circuit court and 1355 in the superior court, as against 1615 disposed of in the circuit court and 1611 in the superior court. A study
in 1951 indicated that each of the 17 downstate circuit courts receives
about 1800 new cases a year and disposes of 1400 on the average.7 A
1952 study estimated that cases filed before justices of the peace and
police magistrates in 1951 amounted to approximately 47,000 civil
cases and 163,000 minor criminal cases." The Municipal Court of
Chicago receives and disposes of about 190,000 civil (of which 8,000
are jury cases) and 125,000 criminal cases a year, together with over
1,000,000 traffic violations.' The business of the trial courts is, in
short, big business. But it is for the most part not possible to run it in
a business-like manner.
The judges are so handicapped by the lack of administrative machinery for running the courts that they are unable to cope with today's volume of judicial business. The backlog of cases awaiting trial
in the circuit and superior courts of Cook County has increased until
it stands at the astronomical figure of about 47,042 pending and undisposed of cases as of March 1, 1955. A jury case filed today must
take its place at the end of the lists and, unless there are compelling
'Bulletin, Illinois Legislative Council, Relief for Heavily Populated Downstate Circuits (Jan. 1951).
'Local Government Notes, op. cit. supra note 6.
' Municipal Court of Chicago, Report of the Civil and Criminal Divisions, 1953
(Feb., 1954).
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reasons for advancing it on the list, will have to wait 40 to 48 months
before being reached for trial. This situation is not limited to Cook
County. The backlog in some downstate circuits is such that jury
cases must sometimes wait from 6 to 12 months before being reached
for trial. Some circuits include so many counties that a person
arrested or indicted shortly after the adjournment of court may have
to wait six months before the circuit judge returns to hear the indictment or trial, as the case may be.
The lawyers and the judges know it is as true today as it was in
June of 1215 A.D. when the Barons entered into the Magna Carta with

King John that justice delayed is justice denied. Heroic efforts are
being made to end delays by using new techniques in assignment of
cases for trial, by obtaining legislative increases in the number of
judges, by requesting judges from other areas of the state to volunteer
their help, and by the judges working additional hours or weeks. But
the volume of judicial business is such that there is no real prospect
that these efforts will.eliminate delays; and it is a major obligation of
the bench and bar in Illinois today to revise the judicial system itself
so that every citizen will receive prompt justice.
ELECTION OF JUDGES IN

1955

The Illinois Constitution of 1818 provided that judges should be
elected by the legislature. This was a variation of a system which had
prevailed in most of the states since colonial days, namely, appointment by the governor. This was changed by the Jacksonian revolution, a wave of popular feeling which demanded that most officers of
state government be elected by popular vote and be required periodically thereafter to go before the voters. The 1848 and 1870 Constitutions each provided for popular election of judges.
The legislature, within the constitutional framework providing for
popular election, has established two systems of nomination and election, one for the supreme, circuit and superior courts, and one for the
other trial courts. Under the first system, candidates are nominated
by each party in conventions of political leaders and elected by the
voters at a special judicial election. The other system involves nomination in a party primary and election at a general election.
The methods of selecting judges in Illinois, therefore, are today
substantially those adopted in the 1800's. Changes since the 1800's,
however, have too often transformed the popular election of judges
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into the political selection of judges. Public interest in judicial elections is generally slight. In the 1951 election for supreme court justices, out of about 4,573,000 registered voters, only 1,050,000 voted,
so that five supreme court judges were chosen at an election in which
less than one-fourth of the voters voted. In the 1954 election for a
supreme court justice from the Fifth District, the two political parties
each nominated the same candidate, so that, with no contest, only 93
out of 18,135 voters in Galesburg bothered to vote and voter participation in the "popular" election was almost non-existent.
Moreover, the traditional predominance of one political party over
the other in some parts of the state is sometimes so great that only one
party nominates candidates for judgeships. In still other parts of the
state the temporary political situation is often such that the two political parties find it expedient to agree in advance of their conventions
that the slate to be offered the voters will be a "coalition" slate,
whereby each party offers the voters the same slate of candidates. In
1945 through 1948, out of 53 circuit judges elected in the seventeen

downstate circuits, there were coalition tickets of three judges each
in three circuits, or nine judges, in effect, appointed by the two political parties. In five other circuits, only one party nominated any candidate so that fifteen judges were appointed by that party. In four
other circuits, one party nominated a full slate of candidates and the
other party nominated only one candidate in each circuit, so that the
voters had no choice as to eight out of twelve candidates. In other
words, in the years 1945 through 1948, sixty per cent of the circuit
judges downstate were not elected by popularvote but were in effect
selected by the political parties.10
In Chicago and in the other growing metropolitan areas of the
state, because of the large numbers of people in the election districts,
the voters rarely know the candidates and vote only for the political
party of their preference. With the voters not knowing the candidates, and in no position to weigh their qualifications, the task of
selecting judges in such metropolitan centers has more and more been
left to the political parties.
Under these circumstances, neither the convention method nor
the primary method has operated so as to produce the popular election of judges which was the aim of the 1870 Constitution.
"joint Committee on Judicial Article, Explanatory Statement on Proposed Judicial
Article 75 (1953).
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CHANGES NEEDED

This system of courts and this way of choosing judges needs
changes in three respects. First, the court structure should be simplified and fitted to today's needs. Second, the courts should be given
the administrative tools with which they will be able more efficiently
to manage their business, expedite the disposition of cases, and reduce
the expense of litigation. Third, the methods of selecting judges
should be improved so as to give deserving judges greater security of
tenure in office and to make possible a method of selecting judges in
which the candidate's qualifications to be a judge, and not his political
party affiliation, will be the principal consideration.
NEEDED-SIMPLIFIED AND MODERN COURT STRUCTURE

The Illinois court structure was designed to meet the needs of the
state in 1848 and in 1870. Some of those needs no longer exist. For
instance, in 1848 and 1870 there was need to have some court in each
county to appoint conservators for mentally ill persons, to appoint
guardians for minors, and to settle the estates of deceased persons.
The volume of such business was not so great as to require the full
time of a judge in every county. At the same time, there were not
enough lawyers to be certain that one could be found in every county
to serve as judge. To meet this situation, the constitutional conventions of 1848 and 1870 provided for a county court in every county.
In the heavily populated counties, in addition to the county court,
there was to be a probate court to settle decedents' estates. Since it
was doubted that there was enough judicial business to keep a county
judge occupied on a full time basis in all the counties, it was provided
that the legislature could assign additional jurisdiction to the county
courts. As a result, the county courts today have jurisdiction of all
sorts of unrelated matters, ranging from the review of orders of the
Department of Agriculture for destruction of diseased bees, to jurisdiction in some areas to appoint election commissioners. Since it was
believed that there would not be enough lawyers to staff all the
county courts, no requirement was made that the county judge be a
lawyer. Since it was realized that county and probate judges would
not always be lawyers, it was provided that certain matters decided
by them could be appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo, or
a re-trial of the whole case just as if there had never been a trial in
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the county or probate court. 1 Finally, since it was not easy to go
from county to county at all times of the year, the courts were to be
self-sufficient and independent of each other.
The situation which gave rise to these constitutional provisions no
longer exists. There is still the need for courts in local areas to handle
the appointment of conservators and so on, but there are now enough
lawyers so that it should be required that the county and probate
judges be lawyers. If the judges are lawyers, and if they spend full
time on their judicial duties, there is no longer any reason for permitting trial de novo. Moreover, communication and travel between
counties is today so rapid that there is no longer any reason to have
the courts separate and independent.
A single trial court for each circuit is today not only possible but
sensible. A single trial court, with branches created to meet special
needs, will provide simplicity of organization, will avoid the problems
of overlapping jurisdiction and duplication of effort, and will conserve judicial manpower. This will end the loss of time and money
over the question whether the suit has been filkd in the right court.
There will only be one trial court. If the suit is in the wrong branch
of the court, it can be transferred to the right branch by a simple
order of reassignment. There will be no costly trials de novo. Where
special needs exist, these needs can be best met, not by statutes providing for a new court for every such need, but by the simple expedient
of an order of the circuit court providing for an additional branch
of that court to meet the need. Such a trial court would have the
flexibility to meet the changing requirements of the times. If the problem of sex offenders is acute, the court could create a branch to deal
with such matters. The complex problems of family life could be
handled by such branch or branches as might be required. The need
is not for a large number of specialist courts, but for a single trial
court with such numbers of specialist judges as are required. There
is clearly a need for a unified trial court in each circuit.
Similar considerations indicate need for change in the jurisdiction
of the supreme and appellate courts. In 1848 and 1870, the ownership
of land was such an important element in the economy that it was
provided there could be direct appeal from a trial court to the supreme court in any case involving a freehold. Today, the ownership
of land is not of such preeminent importance, and there is no reason
" Edmunds, op. cit. supra note 4, at 510.
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why the supreme court should be compelled to take every case in,
volving any question of ownership of land, any more than it should
be compelled to take every question involving ownership of a corporate security. Yet, because of the 1870 constitutional provision, the
supreme court in 1946-47 was compelled to devote over twenty per
cent of its published opinions to questions relating to freeholds and
was able to devote only about two per cent of its opinions to cases
involving questions of business law. 1 2 It has already been pointed out,
moreover, that the burden of compulsory appeals is such that the
supreme court presently has little control over what cases it will hear
and little or no time to devote to the rules of practice and the administrative affairs of the courts. There is clearly need for revising
the jurisdiction of the supreme and appellate courts to fit today's
needs.
NEEDED-CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY

The judicial department is the only department in Illinois with no
administrative office and no central administrative authority whatsoever. The supreme court is supreme in the sense that it is the court of
ultimate appeal, but it is not supreme in any way related to the actual
running of the system. It has no means of determining how much
judicial business is carried on in the appellate and trial courts. Even if
it had the statistics, it has no authority to assign judges from the less
busy courts to the courts desperately in need of assistance. The
supreme court does have authority to assign circuit judges for service
in the appellate court and limited authority to assign circuit judges to
other circuits.13 But it has no authority freely to assign judges from
one circuit to another, or from the appellate court to the supreme
court, or between the great variety of other courts in the state. There
is no administrative supervision whatsoever over justices of the peace
and police magistrates. There are few statistics concerning the flow
of judicial business, other than those collected from time to time by
the clerks of court or by legislative or private agencies.
This disorganized state of affairs hurts the lawyers and the judges
themselves. The lack of up-to-date statistics on the work of the courts
makes it difficult for the judges to compete before the legislature with
more efficiently run departments in requests for appropriations or
additional personnel. The inefficiency of the courts sometimes results
in demands that administrative agencies be created to take over fune",Speck, op. cit. supra note 3.

"11
I1. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 37, § 72.30.
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tions traditionally performed by, and properly to be decided by, the
courts. If the judicial department is to keep its place as one of the
three principal branches of state government, there must be provision
for modem and efficient administration.
The lack of adequate administrative machinery to run the courts
hurts the public most of all. This lack is the principal cause of the
mounting backlog and delays. The public has just cause for complaining about judges who are tardy in opening court or who take vacations in the busiest seasons of the year; but the public must realize that
no one in the judicial department has much authority to do anything
about it. Tardiness and neglect of duty, whether wilful or from human frailties which beset judges as well as others, are only the symptoms and not the disease. The disease and the root of the matter is the
almost complete lack of administrative machinery for the courts.
There is desperate need for some central administrative authority to
create and run such machinery so as to bring order out of chaos and
to put an end to the injustice of long delays.
NEEDED-A BETTER METHOD OF SELECTING JUDGES

The system of popular election of judges under the 1870 constitution, even if it functioned as intended, has certain inherent limitations. In the first place, it unduly limits the group of lawyers from
whom judges are chosen, to those who are able and willing to participate actively in partisan politics. There are many lawyers who are
not willing to enter politics but who are by temperament and training well qualified tb serve as judges. In the second place, the expense
of campaigning for office in a contested election further limits the
group of candidates for judgeships to lawyers who have accumulated
money of their own or who are able to secure some sort of financial
backing. Finally, judicial elections are frequently affected by the
issues of national party politics which have nothing to do with the
merits of the judicial candidates. This means not only that the better
qualified judicial candidate may lose simply because he is a member
of the less popular political party, but also that a deserving judge
seeking re-election may have his judicial career cut short by pure happenstance.
The system of popular election of judges, even though subject to
these limitations, might still be justified if it allowed a truly popular
choice from a group of qualified candidates. However, the elective
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system has today come to the point where it is clear that the people
have little, if any, choice in selecting judges. To all intents and purposes the leaders of the political party organizations appoint most of
our judges. Mention has already been made of the ways in which this
has come about. The voters in the metropolitan areas today usually
do not know the candidates and vote for the political party of their
preference. In the 1800's, most of the people were directly involved
with the courts, in watching trials and talking about them, and in
appraising the judges and lawyers. Today, there are far fewer people
who know enough about any one judge or lawyer in their area to
make an informed judgment as to his qualifications to be a judge. The
qualities of a good judge are integrity, judicial temperament, legal
ability and diligence in the dispatch of business. Since few people
know enough about the candidates to form an opinion on these matters, the task of selecting judges in the cities has more and more been
left to the political parties. The party officials, for reasons made necessary by their particular purposes and functions, consider primarily the
candidate's past service in the politicalorganization,his ability to contribute an assessment to the party campaign funds, and the likelihood
of his continuing party loyalty. While there is nothing inherently
wrong with politics as such, political methods of selecting judges are
wrong because the decision is based on too many considerations other
than their qualifications to be judges. Since all the evidence points
toward continued growth of the cities, there is every reason to believe that these conditions will not diminish but will continue to deteriorate unless changed.
The system for popular election of judges has fallen down not only
in cities but, on many occasions, throughout the state. Wherever one
of the political parties has a substantial margin of power over the
other, whether due to a traditional predominance in the area or to
national or local politics, that political party is in a position to, and
does, appoint the judges.
So long as the present methods of selecting judges prevail, the Illinois courts, however organized, will not be able fully to perform
their function. That most of the judges are able and honest is not
questioned, but this is more in spite of than because of the present
methods of selecting them. The present system involves the candidates and judges in politics whether they like it or not. There is usually no other way to become or remain a judge.
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The involvement of judges in politics tends to destroy the confidence of the people in the courts. For when people hear that a
candidate for a judgeship must contribute an assessment to a political
party's campaign funds, when they hear of the maneuvering which
inevitably goes on in making up a party slate, and when "control" of
a court is made a bone of contention between the parties, then the
people believe that the political considerations which entered into the
choosing of the judge will enter into the judge's decisions once he is
on the bench. That such is not the case does not alter the fact that
large numbers of people believe it to be so. This widespread lack of
confidence in the courts is a cancer on the body politic. It leads people to think that judges can be "bought." It makces it possible for some
few corrupt lawyers and court attaches to ask litigants for pay or for
legal business on the supposed ground that they can "fix" the judge.
At the very least, it makes it hard for even the most courageous judge
to decide cases honestly and without thought of political consequences. All this seriously reduces the effectiveness of the courts as
instruments of justice. To the extent that it reduces the faith of the
people in their ability to have fair and honest judges, it is a threat to
democracy itself. It is ironic that a system designed to produce popularly elected judges has so often operated to produce a lack of confidence in the courts.
The system of popular selection of judges is not working, and there
is no present prospect of any sensible revision of that system which
would enable it to work in practice as it is supposed to in theory.
There is great need for consideration of an entirely different method
of selecting judges.
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE

There has been discussion of the need for a new Judicial Article
since 1905. There have been several efforts to amend the article. In
1922 the constitutional convention included a completely new judicial article in its draft of a proposed new constitution. That constitution failed of adoption by the people not because of any wide disagreement over the need for a new judicial article, but because the only
choice was to accept or reject the proposed constitution in its entirety.
Following World War II, there was a growing demand for modernization of the 1870 Constitution, including the Judicial Article. This
demand resulted in the adoption of the Gateway Amendment in November, 1950, designed to liberalize the amending procedures of the
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constitution and to "open the gate" for future amendments. Since then,
amendments have been proposed to all the principal articles of the constitution, including the revenue and legislative articles.
The current effort to amend the Judicial Article started in 1951.
Lawyers who had worked for the Gateway Amendment produced the
first drafts of a new Judicial Article in February, 1951. The Illinois

State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association next appointed
a Joint Committee on the Judicial Article. The 1951 General Assembly created an interim Legislative Commission to report to the 1953
session. The Joint Committee and the Legislative Commission, working together, were ready in 1953 with a new Judicial Article.
THE

1953

PROPOSAL

The 1953 Judicial Article Amendment proposed the reorganization
of the entire judicial system of the state and a new method for selection of judges. There were to be improvements in the jurisdiction of
the supreme and appellate courts. The complex system of trial courts
was to be replaced with one unified trial court in each circuit. Justices of the peace and police magistrates were to be abolished and a
new full-time judicial position, the magistrate, created to take their
place. Masters in chancery, and all other judicial officers paid from
fees assessed against the litigants, were to be abolished. All judges were
to be lawyers and to be required to devote full time to their judicial
duties.
The proposal gave the supreme court administrative authority over
all the courts. It created an administrative office to aid the court in
its work.
The greatest change, and the most controversial, was a new method
for the selection of judges. All judges in the state were to be chosen
by a method involving three steps-nomination by commission, appointment by the governor, and election by the people. Nomination
was to be by commissions made up half of laymen appointed by the
governor and half of lawyers elected by all the lawyers. The commission would furnish a panel of nominees to the governor. The governor
would appoint one of the nominees to be judge. After serving a short
trial period, the judge would go before the people on a special judicial ballot without opposition, and on the sole question, "Shall Judge
X be retained in office?" After serving his term, the judge would
again go before the people, unopposed, and on the sole question
whether he should be retained as judge.
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The task was to secure legislative approval of this proposal. Even
under a liberalized amending procedure, a constitutional amendment
in Illinois must first be approved by the legislature and then by the
people. Legislative approval requires a two-thirds vote in each house.
To accomplish this, a statewide Citizens Committee for the Judicial
Amendment was organized. This Committee distributed almost one
hundred thousand copies of the amendment and explanatory material. Popular response to the campaign was strong and favorable.
The proposal was acted upon first in the Senate. There was substantial agreement on all the provisions except those on selection and
tenure. It was suggested that it should be possible to make changes in
the new methods for selection without again having to amend the
constitution. To meet this suggestion, the proposal was modified to
provide that the sections on selection and tenure might be changed
from time to time by legislative act, provided that no such law should
take effect until approved by a majority of the voters at a popular
referendum. On June 3, 1953, the Senate voted 35 to 13 to approve
the proposal.
On June 11, 1953, the amendment reached the floor of the house.
It needed 102 votes for passage. For reasons principally related to the
provisions on selection and tenure, it was never able to secure more
than 77 votes. On June 24, 1953, the house voted to table the matter
and the 1953 campaign was at an end. Although the campaign ended
short of complete success, it was clear that the progress made was
remarkable for so sweeping and controversial a measure.
The proposal found an immediate and willing response among the
people in Illinois, who on every hand acclaimed the plan for modern
and businesslike administration of the courts and who welcomed the
possibility of "taking the' judges out of politics." The proposal was
recognized throughout the United States as offering an opportunity
for one of the greatest advances in judicial organization and administration in modem times.
THE 1955 PROPOSAL

Encouraged by the progress made in the first attempt to secure

legislative passage of a new judicial article, the two bar associations
re-appointed the Joint Committee which had drafted the first proposal. The Joint Committee reviewed the 1953 proposal in the light
of the campaign; and after several sessions, submitted a new draft of
the proposal on February 12, 1955. It is this proposal which was in-
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troduced in the legislature on March 8, 1955, and which is presently
being considered by the legislature.
The 1955 proposal provides for a single trial court in each circuit
to be known as the circuit court, with power to try every type of case.
There will be at least one branch of the circuit court sitting in each
county with a full-time judge resident in the county. It will be possible for the circuit court to create additional branches, with general
or special functions, such as a family court, as needed.
Each circuit court will have three classifications of judicial officers
-circuit judges, associate judges, and magistrates. All judges of the
various trial courts in office when the proposal becomes effective will
be absorbed into the circuit courts. Throughout the state, police magistrates and justices of the peace will become magistrates of the circuit courts. Provision is made for special magistrates in such rural
communities as need part-time magistrates only, to perform such
emergency functions as the supreme court may prescribe.
All judges and magistrates will be paid by the state, except that
counties desiring special magistrates will be responsible for their compensation. Counties and municipalities will be relieved of their present responsibilities for salaries of judges of certain courts, except that
the legislature may require Cook County to continue to supplement
the compensation of its judicial personnel. The fee system by which
justices of the peace, referees and masters in chancery are presently
compensated, and their offices, will be abolished.
The power to review decisions of the circuit courts will be vested
in an appellate court and a supreme court. Most appeals will be taken
to the appellate court, but in any case involving a constitutional question and in any capital case resulting in a sentence, appeal can be
taken from the circuit court directly to the supreme court. The
supreme court will have exclusive authority to permit direct appeals
in other types of cases.
In general, litigants will be entitled to only one appeal. The supreme
court will be required to review decisions of the appellate court when
a constitutional question arises and when the appellate court certifies
that its decision involves a question of such importance that it ought
to be decided by the supreme court. In all other cases decided by
the appellate court, it will be up to the supreme court to decide
whether a second appeal should be allowed.
By virtue of these provisions, the supreme court will be able to
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act, not only as the court of ultimate appeal in the state, but as the
central authority supervising the administrative affairs of the judicial
department of the state.
With centralized administrative authority in the supreme court, it
will be possible for the courts to deal directly with backlogs and delays. Judges may be given temporary assignments to courts where they
are most needed. As in the federal court system, an administrative
director and staff will compile the needed information. With such
up-to-date administrative machinery, it should be possible in Illinois,
as it has been in New Jersey, to reduce the backlogs of cases to the
point where no litigant in Illinois need wait longer than 6 to 9 months
for the trial of his case.
Only citizens licensed to practice law in Illinois will be eligible for
the office of judge or magistrate. All judges and magistrates will be
required to devote full time to their judicial duties, and while so serving will be prohibited from holding any other public office, practicing law or engaging in political activity. Since these provisions are for
the most part new, they will not take full effect until the expiration
of the terms of office of incumbents. They will not apply to special
magistrates, whose functions will be limited and will not involve fulltime service.
A commission consisting of judges chosen from the various courts
will have power, in proper proceedings, to retire any judge for physical or mental disability or to suspend or remove him from office for
cause. No such procedure is possible under the present constitution.
The proposal will not affect the remedy of impeachment available to
the legislature, but it will replace a virtually unused procedure under
which the legislature may at the present time, without impeachment,
remove judges for cause.
The legislature will have power to provide for voluntary or involuntary retirement of judges at such age as may be fixed by law.
Retired judges will, however, be allowed to perform judicial service
assigned to them by the Supreme Court. At the present time no judge
may be retired without his consent until the expiration of his term
of office, and then only if he is not re-elected.
The provisions of the 1955 proposal with regard to selection and
tenure are designed to meet the objections raised by opponents during
the 1953 campaign. The principal aim is to take the judges out of
politics. The method presently proposed to achieve this end is to
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provide that, first, every judge, however selected, shall have the
right at the end of his term to run without opposition on the sole
question whether he should be selected for another term and, second,
although the 1955 proposal does not itself establish a new system for
selection of judges, to require the submission to the voters in 1958
of such a new system.
Every judge is given the right to seek retention in office without
opposition, because it is believed that the people can then vote on the
only important question in such an election, namely, his qualifications
to remain a judge. Moreover, the federal and other systems demonstrate that security of tenure generally results in judges who are not
involved in and who are independent of politics. It is in the public interest that it be made possible for sitting judges to be independent
and free of politics no matter how the judge may have been initially
chosen.
The provision for a new method of selection of judges was postponed to 1958 in order to separate the most controversial issue from
the rest of the reforms and thereby permit all interested in court reform to unite on the basic proposal. The new proposal guarantees
continuance of the principle of popular election until a substitute
method is approved by referendum. In this way, the people alone will
determine the controversial issue of how they wish their judges initially chosen.
The plan of selection which will be submitted in 1958 substitutes
for the present methods of choosing judges a new system of nomination by special commissions, followed by a vote of the people at a
general election to determine whether the nominee should be approved and elected. The nominating commissions will consist half
of lawyers appointed by the supreme court and the other half of laymen appointed by the Governor, both groups to be selected on a bipartisan basis for staggered terms. This plan removes the major criticisms urged against the method of selection proposed in 1953.
First, the function of the Governor is limited to appointing the lay
members of the commissions; he will have no power over the appointment of judges. Second, the appointment of the lawyer members by the supreme court overcomes the criticism that the election
of these members by the lawyers would be controlled by the bar
associations. Third, the provision for bipartisan selection of commission members is as much of a safeguard as can be devised to insure

THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL REFORM IN ILLINOIS

Ill

non-partisan consideration of the candidate. Finally, no candidate

designated by a commission can become a judge unless the voters say
he shall become one.
This plan for selection of judges is not new but is a variation of
plans in effect in Missouri and California. Missouri in 1940 abandoned the system of popular election of judges for most of its courts

and adopted a plan involving nomination by a commission, appointment by the Governor, and running for retention in office without
opposition solely on the question, "Shall Judge X be retained?" Under
this system qualified Democratic judges were retained in office in
1942 and 1946 despite general Republican victories; and in 1944 and
1948, when the state went Democratic, all Republican judges were
retained. Moreover, it has been possible to reject unfit judges. One
Democratic judge was rejected in a predominantly Democratic area
in a Democratic year. Voters in Missouri have been satisfied with
this system for taking judges out of politics and have twice voted
down attempts to repeal it; in 1942 by a vote of 180,000 and in 1945
by an even greater vote. California in 1934 abandoned the elective
system for some of its courts, in favor of a system of appointment by
the governor, subject to confirmation by a commission, and with the
judge running for retention in office as in the Missouri system. The

present Illinois plan is a variation of these plans, fitted to the needs
of this state. In passing, it should be pointed out that the elective system is not the rule in all the states. Twelve states have appointive
systems. In six states judges are chosen by the legislature. In twentyone states all judges are selected by general election, and, in fourteen
more, all except some lower court judges are so selected. In many of
these last states there has been growing dissatisfaction with recurrent

breakdowns in the elective systems, and proposals for change are
today being considered in at least one-third of these states.
The 1955 plan for selection and tenure of judges is designed to be

flexible and to be subject to the will of the people. Whether or not
the people vote in 1958 to adopt the new system for initial selection
of judges, the legislature may at any time provide for changes in the
selection and tenure of judges, but no such law will take effect unless
approved by the voters. Thereby no system of selection and tenure
is frozen into the constitution but is subject to change at the will of
the people as future needs may dictate.
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CONCLUSION

There are periods of ebb and flow in any movement for change.
The tide is still running strong for change in the judicial system in
Illinois. The desire for change is found not only among those who are
helpless victims of four-year delays in Cook County, but just as
strongly among those downstate who must wait for the circuit judge
to reappear at their county seat. The desire is found among the lawyers and the judges themselves who must today endure the frustrations, the delays, and the archaic ways of a system designed for a
day long since past. The desire is found in all those who realize that
thriving businesses, new schools, strong police departments, and a
solvent state government are worth little unless the rights of each
individual citizen can be safeguarded, not only in his relations with
his fellow men, but in his relations to the state itself. The desire is
found in all those who realize that without justice, a society, however
strong in material things, is weak and vulnerable.
The challenge is clear. The response to the challenge must be
strong. The legal profession in Illinois will be judged by the leadership it affords. More than that, the people of the state will themselves be judged by the measure of their response. For the courts do
not exist for the lawyers or the judges or the politicians, but for the
people; and as the courts exist for the people, so the people are duty
bound therein to establish justice. Nowhere can a plainer statement of
this be found than in that provision of the Bill of Rights of the Illinois Constitution which proclaims:
Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation; he
ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely and without being obliged
to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay.

